Abstract. A paradigm of scientific discovery is defined within a first-order logical framework. Within this paradigm, the concept of "successful scientific inquiry" is formalized and investigated. Among other results, it is shown that a simple method of scientific inquiry is universal in the sense that it leads to success on every problem for which success is in principle possible.
Introduction
The present paper advances a formal paradigm of scientific investigation, defines a specific method of inquiry within it, and then demonstrates that the method is universal in the following sense. Given any scientific situation that can be represented by the paradigm, if there is some method that leads to scientific success in that situation, then our method does so also. In addition, the method is machine simulable.
The method in question is a rough implementation of the following advice to scientists.
(1) Suppose that you know theory T to be true and that you are in possession of data-set o. Then: a) Believe T and ~. b) Believe any single claim ~ of the form VYA2 (with A quantifier-free) that does not contradict T and or. c) Believe the logical consequences of your beliefs. d) Believe nothing else. e) Announce as a hypothesis the first sentence 0 (in some fixed, well-ordering of sentences) such that: i. you believe 0; ii. 0 has a suitably complex or otherwise interesting form; iii. 0 does not follow logically from T and o.
If you follow the advice then (e)ii will prevent you from announcing insipid hypotheses, and (e)iii will prevent you from annoucing hypotheses that do not rest on genuinely inductive inference. Of course, these latter virtues also accrue to the advice: "Advance no hypotheses at all!" So the merit of the advice depends on the fact that it underlies a universal method of inquiry, as will be demonstrated. Before such a demonstration can be attempted, several concepts must be clarified, a task that leads naturally to the definition of a formal paradigm of empirical inquiry. Such a paradigm serves as an abstract model of genuine scientific investigation, including a representation of background theories T, of the states of Nature consistent with T, of the data available to scientists, and of scientific success. Within such a context, (1) can be translated into a specific method of scientific investigation, and the associated universality claim takes on precise mathematical meaning. Needless to say, the interest of such a claim is bounded by the fidelity to actual empirical inquiry of the underlying formal paradigm. Although there can be no definitive judgment about such fidelity, we note that variants of our paradigm have already been the focus of studies devoted to diverse aspects of scientific investigation (see Gaifman, Osherson & Weinstein, 1990; Glymour, 1985; Osherson, Stob & Weinstein, 1988; Glymour & Kelly, 1989; and Shapiro, 1981) .
The present discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and motivates the paradigm, and Section 3 reformulates (1) as a method of inquiry. In Section 4 we state a theorem which establishes that using the method is a guarantee for scientific success in any situation where success is possible and some corollaries of this theorem. Proofs of the theorem and corollaries may be found in Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1990) . Section 5 contains a brief discussion of another paradigm of scientific inquiry. The final section is devoted to concluding remarks.
A paradigm of scientific inquiry

Preliminaries
Our paradigm is embedded in a first-order logical context. We fix for the remainder of the discussion a countable, first-order language £ with identity. The sentences of ~ are denoted by ~se,, the formulas by ~fo,n. ~ ~ ~fo,n is called basic just in case ~ is an atomic formula or the negation of such. The set of all basic formulas is denoted BAS. The set {0, 1, 2, . . . } of natural numbers is denoted by N. We rely on the following convention regarding implication between sets of open formulas, namely: given X, Y c ~form, X ~ Y " iff for all structures d and all assignments h to the variables of
~ ~se~ is existential if ¢ has the form 32A2, where A is quantifier-free. In the sequel " we shall be interested in the set of existential sentences satisfied by a given structure for ~. Thus we define:
(2) DEFINITION: Let structure d be given. The set {~p E ~sen t d ~ ~o and ~ is existential} is denoted by Th3(d).
States o f Nature
Within our paradigm, a possible state of Nature is interpreted as a countable structure that interprets ~. It is possible to extend our paradigm to structures with uncountable domains (see Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1991) ) for such extension in an analogous setting). For simplicity such extension is not developed here. Henceforth, by "structure" is meant countable structure that interprets ~.
Nature is conceived as arbitrarily choosing one structure from a predefined class of possibilities; the chosen structure is the "actualized" possibility, unknown to the scientist at first. The task of the scientist is to discover some interesting property of Nature's choice. For this purpose, Nature provides hints in the form of basic formulas satisfiable in the structure she has chosen. The scientist must convert these hints into a stable, true and interesting hypothesis about the unknown structure. To make this clear, we rely on the following terminology.
By a complete assignment to a structure d is meant any mapping of the (countable) set of variables of ~ onto Id[. Thus, a complete assignment to d provides every member of I d[ with at least one temporary name. Given a theory T c ~sen, the class of structures that satisfy Tis denoted MOD(T). The class of structures from which Nature makes her choice is conceived as having the form MOD(T) for some T c_ ~sen" Such a class may be interpreted as all the possible realities consistent with existing scientific: knowledge, namely, the knowledge embodied in the background theory T. The contents of this class may be communicated to the scientist via T.
The data made available to scientists
Nature provides information about her chosen structure d by placing the scientist in an environment governed by d. This idea is formalized as follows. An environment is any ~sequence over BAS. The set of formulas appearing in an environment e is denoted by range(e). We conceive of. 42 E range(e) [respectively, --,.42 E range(e) ] as a message from Nature of the form: "The objects assigned temporary names 2 fall [do not fall] into the set that interprets A." The following definition specifies the sense in which a structure governs an environment. To illustrate, suppose that the following environment e is for structure d. Then e may be construed as the following, endless message about d.
The object given temporary name x2 belongs to P6. The object with temporary name x3 is such that the pair x3, x2 belongs to the complement of Qe. The objects given temporary names x4 and x 5 are identical. Object x 4 (and hence object xs) belongs to p~ . . .
An environment for a structure d provides a clear picture of d. This is the content of the following lemma, proved in Osherson and Weinstein (1986) .
(4) LEMMA: Let environment e and structures d and q/'be given. I f e is for both ¢S and then d and the are isomorphic.
Given i E N and environment e, the finite initial segment of length i in e is denoted by ~.. The next two lemmas are easy consequences of the Compactness Theorem and will be used later. Their formulation is aided by the following notation. 
Scientists
Scientists are conceived as working in an environment e for a structure ¢S by examining gl, ~2 . . . . . in turn. After each such examination, the scientist announces some 0 E ~sen to express the hypothesis that d ~ 0. Lernma (4) ensures that no ambiguity arises about the truth of such hypotheses. To proceed formally, let SEQ be the set of all finite sequences over BAS. (Thus, SEQ = {ei [ e is an environment and i E N}.) By a (formal) scientist is meant any function from SEQ to ~sen. Note that scientists can be total or partial, computable or uncomputable.
2.~ Success
To be successful in a given environment, we stipulate that a scientist's successive conjectures must eventually stabilize to a sentence that is true and interesting. Stabilization is equated with "convergence," defined as follows.
(8) DEFINITION: Let environment e, 0 E ~sen, and scientist 9 be given, q converges on e to 0 just in case q(~i) --0 for all but finitely many i E N. In this case we write ,I,(e) = O.
We now consider the conditions under which a hypothesis 0 is interesting. That 0 be true may be entered as the first such condition. The other conditions are that:
(a) 0 be suitably complex; and Co) 0 not be a logical consequence of the background theory plus the available data.
Condition (a) might require that 0 exhibit a certain quantificational form such as being logically equivalent over the background theory to no II 2 or ~2 sentence. Rather than attempting to stipulate once and for all the kind of complexity required, we shall leave such specification as a free parameter in our definition of "interesting hypothesis" Condition (b) is intended to disallow hypotheses that are mere logical consequences of the information available to a scientist, resting on no scientific competence of an inductive or empirical nature. Whether a hypothesis satisfies Co) thus depends on the background theory communicated to the scientist and on the structure underlying the environment in which he is working. These items also figure as parameters in our definition.
(9) DEFINITION: Let T, P c_ ~sen, structure d, and 0 E ~sen be given. 0 is d, T, Pinteresting just in case:
In the definition, P represents the class of potentially interesting hypotheses (having the right form or complexity), T represents the background theory communicated to the scientist, and d represents Nature's choice of reality from among MOD(T). By Lemma (6), clause (c) may be read: 0 does not follow from T conjoined with any evidence available in an environment for d.
Within our paradigm, scientific success is conceived as extending the background theory by adding a true and interesting hypothesis. Success is thus called "extension," as specified in the following definition.
(10) DEFINITION: Let T, P _ ~ten and scientist xy be given. 9 P-extends T just in case for every d E MOD(T) and every environment e for d there is 0 E ~s~n such that: (a) 0 is d, T, P-interesting, (b) xIt(e) = 0.
In this case, T is P-extendable.
If P = ~en then the definition comes to this. ~ extends theory T just in case for every environment e for a structure d satisfying T, ,I¢ converges to a sentence that is true in d and does not follow from T U The(d). I f P is a proper subset Of~se n then the additional requirement is imposed that the sentence have suitable complexity or form.
We shortly provide examples of extendability and of nonextendability. First we discuss and set aside some trivial reasons for nonextendability.
Semi-complete theories
Suppose that T c_ ~sen is the background theory communicated to a scientist ~ about the structure d in which ~ is working. If Tis complete then kI, cannot extend knowledge about d, so scientific success is impossible on trivial grounds. But even if T is not complete, Tmay be so strong as to prevent ~ from conjecturing interesting sentences about certain structures. The following definition formulates this idea.
(11) DEFINITION: Let T, P c_ ~sen be given. T is semi-complete with respect to P just in case there is d E MOD(T) such that for all 0 E P, either
The reason that semi-complete theories render extension trivially impossible is this:
(12) LEMMA: Let T, P c_ ~sen be such that T is semi-complete with respect to E Then for some d E MOD(T), {0 E ~sen I 0 is d, T, P-interesting} = 0.
For example, suppose that P = ~sen and that T is model complete (for the concept of model-completeness, see Chang and Keisler (1973, Section 3.1) . Then T is semi-complete with respect to P. This is because of the following fact about model completeness.
(13) Let T c_ ~sen be model complete. Then for every 0 E ~sen there is existential ~ E ~se,, such that T ~ ~ ~ 0.
None of the results of the present paper hinge on the existence of semi-complete theories.
2.Z E~camples
Here is an example of extendabilky followed by an example of nonextendability. The examples follow as corollaries to our main result (for proofs of these corollaries see Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1990, Section 5)).
(14) EXAMPLE: Suppose that z3 is limited to the binary relation symbol R, and let finite T _ ~sen axiomatize the linear orders with either first or last points (or both). Assume that P includes the properly E 2 sentences (i.e., the existential-universal sentences that are not logically equivalent to any sentence of the form 32~ or v2¢ for quantifier free ~). Then some total computable scientist P-extends T. Observe that for all infinite d, od E MOD(T), Th3(d) = The(cb/). So this example shows that extension is not ruled out in such cases.
(15) EXAMPLE: Let ~ be as in Exmple (14), and let T c ~se,, axiomatize the linear orders without endpoints. Then even if P is taken to be all of £~en, T is not P-extendable.
A universal method
The advice given in (1) inspires the design for a specific scientist, to be called "M." M is a Turing machine with two oracles (for a discussion of such devices, see Rogers (1967, Chapter 9) ). One oracle holds whatever theory T is to be extended. The other holds whatever subset P of £se, constitutes the set of potentially interesting hypotheses. If attention is limited to cases in which both T and P are recursively enumerable then/ITs oracles can be replaced by two additional arguments, namely, the corresponding r.e. indices; see Corollary" (19) in Section 4. Our description of M requires two definitions. M relies on two uniform methods. The first converts any oracles T, P c_ ~s~n into a T, P-recursive enumeration of T, P-potential. The second converts any oracles T, P ~ ~ and any a fi SEQ into a T, P-recursive enumeration of T, P, a-cancelled. The compactness and completeness theorems for first-order logic guarantee the existence of such methods. Given T, P c_ ~s~n, a ~ SEQ, and n fi N, the set consisting of the first n members of M's enumeration of T, P, a-cancelled is denoted by [T, P, a-cancelled, n]. Given T, P _c ~sen and r E SEQ, M ~'I" finds the first pair (~, 0) (if such exists) in its enumeration of T, P-potential such that (~, 0) ~ U o=~ [T, P, o-cancelled, length(r) ]. If no such pair exists, then M~'I'(r) is undefined; otherwise, MT'P(z) = 0. This concludes the description of M.
More direct translation of (1) into a mechanical procedure is obstructed by clauses (1)b, e (the set of nonconsequences of T and a is not in general effectively enumerable). It is for this reason that M must generate the set T, P, a-cancelled, which is progressively subtracted from T, P-potential. With this caveat in mind it is not hard to see that M's behavior is in rough conformity with (1).
Universality of M and corollaries thereof
The following theorem establishes that M is universal in the sense of Section 1. The reader may consult Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1990, Section 4) , for a proof of this theorem, (18) THEOREM; For all T, P c ~sen, if T is P-extendable then M r'v P-extends T.
According to the theorem, if T is P-extendable by either computable or noncomputabIe scientist then such extension can be achieved by the machine M outfitted with T and P as oracles. From the definition of M in Section 3 it is clear that the roles played by the oracles for Tand P can be played equally well by r.e. indices for these sets, if such indices exist. This observation yields the following corollary.
(19) COROLLARY; There is a total computable functionf : N x N x SEQ ~ ~en such that for all T, P _ ~en, if T is P-extendable and if t, p E N are r.e. indices for T and P respectively, then ka.f(t, p, ~) P-extends T.
A scientist who is successful on two environments for the same structure may nonetheless converge on them to distinct sentences. We are thus led to formulate a stronger criterion of scientific success, as follows. 1 (20) DEFINITION: Let T, P c_ ~se~ and scientist • be given.
• uniformly P-extemts T just in case for every cS ~ MOD(T) there is ~, T, P-interesting 0 ~ ~sen such that ~(e) = 0 for every environment e for ~3. In this case, T is uniformly P-extendable.
It is obvious that if a theory is uniformly P-extendable then it is P-extendable. The converse follows from the fact--easily verified--that given any T, P c_ ~se,, Mr'e uniformly P-extends T if M zP P-extends T. Thus: (21) COROLLARY: For all T, P c_ ~se~, if T is P-extendable then T is unifbrmly P-extendable.
Our method M has another noteworthy property. For all T, P c Z3se n and all environments e for any d fi MOD(T), if M 1;e converges on e to 0 fi ~se, then 0 is cS, T," P-interesting. This is true whether or not M r'I' P-extends T. Thus, even when M is incapable of P-extending T, M does not misleadingly persevere on a false hypothesis in environments embraced by T. Adapting terminology from Blum and Blum (1975) , scientists with this quality may be termed "reliable."
(22) DEFINITION; Let T, P c_ ~sen and scientist 9 be given. 9 is T, P-reliable just in case for every ~5 fi MOD(T), every environment e for cS, and every 0 E ~en, if 9(e) = 0 then 0 is ~ , T, P-interesting. Combining M's reliability with its uniformity, we have the following.
(23) COROLLARY: There is an oracle machine M such that for all T, P c_ ~sen, MZv is T, P-reliable, and if T is P-extendable then M zP uniformly P-extends T.
Truth detection
The foregoing paradigm is but one example of a formal construal of scientific inquiry. For comparison, we will consider in this section another paradigm of scientific inquiry. Scientific investigation is sometimes directed at determining the truth of a given conjecture on the basis of available data instead of discovering some hypothesis to explain that data. We proceed to modify the paradigm described above to model this notion of inquiry. Once again, the possible states of nature under investigation are interpreted as countable structures for a fixed, countable first-order language ~ with identity and as before, scientists gain access to data about such structures via environments for those structures. Scientists themselves are now taken to be mappings from ~sen × SEQ to {t, f } . Thus, a scientist 9 may be conceived as a system that converts arbitrary 0 E ~s~, into a function ~,cr.9(0, tr) that conjectures a truth-value for 0 in whatever structure ¢5 has given rise to the data or. To be successful on 0 in ¢3, 9 must "detect" the truth-value of 0 in ~3, as specified by the following definition.
(24) DEFINITION: Let 0 E ~sen, structure cS and scientist 9 be given. 9 detects 0 in cS just in case for every complete assignment g to ~S, and every environment e for cS via g, if ~S ~ 0 then 9(0, ~,) = t for cofinitely many n E N, and if ~ ~ --, 0 then 9(0, en) = f for cofinitely many n E N.
Thus, we credit 9 with detecting 0 in ¢S just in case 9's succesive conjectures about the truth-value of 0 in ¢3 eventually stabilize to the correct one in response to increasingly complete information about ~S.
(25) DEFINITION: Let class .T(of structures, 0 E ~sen and scientist 9 be given. 9 detects 0 in .YCjust in case for all ¢3 E .7Q, 9 detects 0 in ~S. In this case 0 is detectable in .7(..
In Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1991) it is shown that detection problems determined by first-order background knowledge admit of a uniform solution. This is the content of the following theorem, a proof of which may be found in Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1991, Section 3) . This theorem yields the following syntactic characterization of detectability as a corollary, a proof of which may be found in Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1991, Section 3) .
(27) COROLLARY: Let 0 E ~sen and T c_ ~sen be given. 0 is detectable in MOD(T) iff both 0 and -~ 0 are equivalent over T to existential-universal sentences.
Theorem (26) suggests the following question: is uniform detection of the truth-value of first-order sentences possible with respect to background knowledge expressed in languages stronger than first-order logic, or does first-order logic enjoy a special status for inductive inference? In Osherson, Stob and Weinstein (1991) , we give a precise sense to this question in the context of abstract model theory. We show that first-order logic can in fact be characterized uniquely in terms of the uniform solvability of the detection problems which are expressible in its language.
Conclusion
The results above suggest that issues in knowledge representation can be fruitfully pursued in connection with a model-theoretic approach to learning. Consider a sophisticated database, DB. Part of the knowledge stored in DB may consist of well-confirmed statements that axiomatize some class of models. To augment its knowledge, DB may rely exclusively on external sources, or DB might launch an investigation of its own aided by an automated system of scientific inquiry. In the latter case, it would be wise for DB to consider its prospects for success. Is there any guarantee that DB could succeed in an arbitrary model of its current axiom set? If DB restricts its attention to the "minimal models" of its axioms by adopting some version of the "closed world hypothesis" might success in its empirical inquiry then be guaranteed? Suppose that DB's discovery routine requires knowledge about the truth of some sentence that does not follow from available data, but does receive support from some nonmonotone rule of inference. To what extent is the reliability of DB's routine compromised by supplying it with information of this sort? Such questions, and others like them, are crucial to the confidence that DB may place in the results of its empirical investigation. It would, therefore, be useful to equip DB in advance with the mathematical means necessary to assess the feasibility of its contemplated empirical inquiry.
The answers to these feasibility questions depend, in part, on the kind of axioms which DB takes as its scientific starting point, for example, whether the axioms are couched in a first-order language, whether they are of special syntactic form, whether attention is restricted to finite models, etc. The answers also depend on the data available to DB and the criterion of success to which it aspires. Progress in answering these questions would in all likelihood be facilitated by deploying the considerable understanding of logical theory that has developed over the last century. This knowledge figures prominently in contemporary theoretical studies of knowledge representation. Perhaps it can be deployed, as well, in computational learning theory, and form a bridge between the two disciplines.
